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ABSTRACT
It is usually assumed in debates about com-
plexity and the philosophy of science that
science is primarily about observation. How-
ever, the starting point for this paper is in-
tervention, defined as purposeful action by
an agent to create change. While some au-
thors suggest that intervention and obser-
vation are opposites, it is argued here that
observation (as undertaken in science)
should be viewed as just one type of inter-
vention. We should therefore welcome sci-
entific techniques of observation into a
pluralistic set of intervention methods, along-
side methods for exploring values, reflect-
ing on subjective understandings, planning
future activities, etc. However, there is a need
to explicitly counter a possible pernicious
interpretation of this argument: intervention
could (erroneously) be viewed as flawlessly
pre-planned change based on accurate pre-
dictions of the consequences of action. This
is the mechanistic worldview that systems
thinking and complexity science seek to
challenge. Therefore, having redefined sci-
entific observation as intervention, the pa-
per revisits insights from systems thinking
and complexity to propose a methodology
of systemic intervention. Some brief reflec-
tions are then provided on the wider social
implications of this methodology.
Keywords: Boundary critique; Complexity;
Critical Systems Thinking; Methodological
Pluralism; Philosophy of Science; Systemic
Intervention; Systems Methodology.
RESUMEN
Esté artículo esquiva los puntos de partida
habituales en el debate sobre la complejidad y
la filosofía de la ciencia que tiende a asumir
que la ciencia trata principalmente sobre la
observación. Aquí el punto de partida es la
intervención, definida como la acción de un
agente que tiene como objetivo crear un cam-
bio. Mientras algunos autores sugieren que la
intervención y la observación son opuestas,
aquí se argumenta que la observación (como
se practica en la ciencia) debería ser vista
como un tipo de intervención. Por lo tanto,
deberíamos dar la bienvenida a las técnicas
científicas de observación dentro de un mar-
co pluralista de métodos de intervención, que
incluya métodos para la exploración de valo-
res, la reflexión sobre la comprensión subjeti-
va, la planificación de actividades futuras, etc.
Sin embargo, existe la necesidad de contestar
explícitamente una posible interpretación per-
niciosa de este argumento: la intervención
podría ser vista erróneamente como el cam-
bio impecablemente pre-planificado y basado
en predicciones exactas sobre las consecuen-
cias de la acción. Esta es la visión mecanicista
del mundo que el pensamiento de sistemas y
la ciencia de la complejidad buscan cambiar.
Una vez redefinida la observación científica
como intervención, el artículo vuelve sobre
las apreciaciones del pensamiento sistémico
y la complejidad para proponer una metodo-
logía de intervención sistémica. Al final, se
hacen algunas reflexiones sobre las amplias
implicaciones sociales de esta metodología.
Palabras Clave:  Límite Crítico,  Com-
plejidad, Sistemas críticos de pensamien-
to, Pluralismo metodológico, Filosofía de
ciencia, Intervención Sistémica, Metodo-
logía de Sistemas.
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Introduction
Many discussions of systems thinking, com-
plexity1 and the philosophy of science take
as their starting point the fact that every-
thing in the world is connected in some di-
rect or indirect way to everything else.
Therefore, the scientific observer is an in-
tegral part of the world s/he observes, not
separate from it (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1968;
Bateson, 1972; Maturana and Varela, 1992).
Additionally, the focus is often on the im-
possibility of both full understanding of phe-
nomena and infallible prediction, because the
complexities of the world slip the grasp of
the human observer (e.g., Casti and
Karlqvist, 1996).2 The significance of this
is that it undermines some of the philosophi-
cal ideas that have traditionally been invoked
in support of science. For instance, it be-
comes possible to question the reliance of
the philosophy of science on the concept of
independent observation.
Independent observation is observation de-
tached from the values and idiosyncrasies of
the observer. This does not mean observation
without the presence of an observer: it simply
means observation that is judged by scien-
tists to be independent of the peculiarities of
any particular individual. In other words, an
independent observation is one that people in
a given scientific community agree would be
the same regardless of who is making it. It is
only if we can say that independent observa-
tion (in the above sense) has been achieved
that we can make a satisfactory claim to objec-
tivity (Popper, 1976).3 Clearly, if we want
observation to be independent in this manner,
intervention by an observer into the observed
has to be prevented—except, that is, inter-
vention to ensure the purity of observation,
such as when a scientist constructs an ex-
periment. Any such intervention could create
a change, thereby making it possible to say
that the observation is a result of the interven-
tion rather than the intrinsic characteristics of
the phenomenon being observed. The fact that
systems and complexity theories say that there
are inevitably direct and/or indirect links be-
tween the observer and observed brings into
1 I treat systems thinking and complexity as a pair
because they share certain characteristics of par-
ticular relevance to this paper. I appreciate that
some authors (e.g., Stacey et al, 2000) contrast
complexity and systems thinking. However, while
I accept the criticisms of early systems thinking
offered by Stacey et al, I disagree with their char-
acterisation of some later systems theories which
I suggest have a lot in common with philosophi-
cal writings in complexity (e.g., Cilliers, 1998;
Richardson et al, 2000). However, this is an argu-
ment that lies beyond the scope of the current
paper.
2 Of course some of these insights, such as the im-
possibility of comprehensive understanding, are
not unique to complexity theory, but have been
discussed by philosophers of science for many
years (see, for example, the work of Popper,
1959). However, the interest in complexity being
shown across the disciplines has placed these prob-
lems at the forefront of the agenda of the phi-
losophy of science once again.
3 Objectivity is not an absolute. Arguably, Popper’s
(1959, 1972) greatest contribution to the philoso-
phy of science is to undermine the positivist claim
that objectivity is actually achievable. His point is
that all claims to objectivity are judged within sci-
entific communities. Because, in principle, the
boundaries of these communities are not closed,
any accepted claim to objectivity may be under-
mined by new participants (or by the original par-
ticipants re-testing the claim). Objectivity is
therefore an ideal we may aim towards. It is not an
actually achievable attribute of an observation.
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question the possibility of observation free of
intervention.4
These are important issues, but it seems to
me that the debate, as it has been framed in
the two paragraphs above, already makes a
very significant (and arguably questionable)
assumption—that scientists should indeed be
concerned primarily with observation. In this
paper I want to enter the debate from an en-
tirely different angle: by discussing the meth-
odology of intervention. To give an initial
definition of intervention, it simply means
‘purposeful action by an agent5 to create
change’.6 This contrasts starkly with the
conventional canons of the philosophy of
science: scientists have traditionally been ex-
horted to avoid intervention for fear of cor-
rupting the purity of observation (except the
kind of intervention that preserves this pu-
rity, such as when an experiment is set up).
I will start the main body of this paper by
exploring how the concept of intervention
has been used by others (but not neces-
sarily in the same way as I use it), focus-
ing on the supposed opposition between
intervention and observation. However, af-
ter comparing these two concepts, I will
seek to show that the distinction between
observation and intervention is not as simple
as it might at first appear, especially given
the problems (mentioned above) with the
idea of independent observation. Indeed, I
will argue that observation should be
viewed as just one type of intervention. As
we shall see, this has profound conse-
quences for understanding the boundaries
between ‘science’ (which has traditionally
had observation as its focus) and other
activities that are more obviously concerned
4 While insights from complexity theory threaten
some of the presuppositions of science, others
remain unchallenged by it. For example, most
complexity theorists share the commitment of
other scientists to a realist philosophy: it is as-
sumed that scientific descriptions do reflect a real
world, even if we can never ultimately measure
the accuracy of this reflection. My own view is
that, if we follow through some of the implica-
tions of complexity theory and systems thinking
to their logical conclusions, the relatively naïve
realism that is often assumed by scientists is
problematised. However, discussion of this is be-
yond the scope of the current paper (see Midgley,
2000, for details).
5 I suggest that an agent can be viewed as either a
single human being, or an identifiable group of
human beings in interaction (e.g., a family, team
or organisation), that have purposes ascribed to
them. In the case of a group, this definition does
not assume that all participating individuals share
the purpose of the whole (indeed, some sub-agents
may act in opposition to the dominant purpose).
However, a group can be called an agent when it
(or its representatives) is perceived as acting to
realise a dominant purpose at the group level re-
gardless of the actions or views of sub-agents. The
word ‘dominant’ here is crucial. It indicates that
the group purpose is a function of whatever
mechanisms of legitimation exist within and be-
yond the group that allow it to be perceived as
moving in one particular direction, regardless of
any counter-arguments being produced by inter-
nal opponents. Therefore, when a government
minister declares war on behalf of a nation, it is
generally accepted that the nation is at war even
if half of its citizens wish to dissent.
6 Obviously, there is much more to say about inter-
vention than this (for a full exposition, see
Midgley, 2000). One thing I should be clear about
here, however, is that the concept of interven-
tion does not presume that it is always possible to
have flawlessly pre-planned change based on ac-
curate predictions of the consequences of action.
This would be a return to the mechanistic view of
the Universe that systems thinking and complex-
ity science have sought to challenge. For more
details, see later in the paper.
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with intervention (e.g., policy-making, per-
sonal and/or group decision-making, man-
agement and community development). I
will argue that scientific methods for struc-
turing observation should be placed along-
side a whole host of other methods for
exploring values, reflecting on subjective
understandings, planning future activities,
etc. Different methods (including scientific
methods) can be useful for different pur-
poses, and can be interrelated as part of
intervention practice.
Having made the case for science as inter-
vention, I will then return to the theme of
systems thinking and complexity in order
to argue specifically for systemic interven-
tion. A broad-based methodology for sys-
temic intervention will be outlined, and
references will be provided to more detailed
work published elsewhere. The paper will
then end with some reflections on the wider
social implications of this methodology.
However, let us begin by exploring the con-
cepts of ‘observation’ and ‘intervention’ in
more detail.
1. Observation versus intervention
Many writers contrast observation and in-
tervention: it appears that both scientists (who
champion observation) and action research-
ers7 (who champion intervention) have an
interest in maintaining this pair of concepts
in opposition to one another. Let us start with
the views of the scientific camp.
1.1 Observation as the basis of
science
While many philosophers of science have
discussed observation, Popper (1959, 1972)
is arguably the best known. Popper claims
that, to be worthy of scientific attention,
“[an] event must be an ‘observable’ event;
that is to say, basic statements must be test-
able, inter-subjectively, by ‘observation’”
(1959, p.102). Hence, traditional science
seeks to place all statements that cannot be
tested by observation outside its remit.
Popper (1959) also proposes the idea that
method is crucial: methods need to be cho-
sen that enable independent observation.
Hence the emphasis in most traditional sci-
entific methodologies on quantitative com-
parisons between ‘experimental’ and
‘control’ conditions (Wright et al, 1970).
However, while high-quality methods are im-
portant, they are not enough on their own:
the final guardian of independent observa-
tion is the scientific community which is
able to re-test findings and subject claims
to critical scrutiny (Popper, 1976).
Arguably, one of the most important aspects
of controlling observation, as far as many
scientists are concerned, is the need to pre-
vent intervention. The observer should not
influence the observed other than, in an ex-
periment, by establishing the required dif-
ference between the experimental and
control conditions, otherwise the results of
the observation could be due to the activi-
7 There are others in the ‘intervention camp’ too,
such as operational researchers, management sci-
entists, evaluators and systems practitioners.
These labels refer to people in a variety of semi-
independent research communities who have simi-
lar interests, but slightly different emphases.
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ties of the scientist rather than the variable(s)
under investigation.
1.1.1 Intervention as the basis
of action research
In marked contrast with Popperian science,
action research is concerned primarily with
intervention8 and not observation: the re-
searcher engages with what is being re-
searched, seeking to bring about positively
valued change. The birth of action research
is widely attributed to Lewin 1946, 1947,
1948, who argues that the focus of the phi-
losophy of science on independent obser-
vation creates a divorce of the scientific
method (especially as it is used in the social
sciences) from social practice.
He stresses that science should be harnessed
for the benefit of human society, and this
requires a very different set of philosophi-
cal and methodological ideas from those tra-
ditionally used. While I would not wish to
confine science to a narrow definition of
applied social research, Lewin’s views are
worth exploring as they provide a useful
starting point for developing a broader un-
derstanding of science as intervention.
To appreciate why action research emerged
in the mid-Twentieth Century, and gained a
great deal of popularity very quickly amongst
many people (especially those working out-
side academia), it is necessary to understand
the orthodoxy that was being propounded
at the time. Popper had been writing about
the importance of experiment and observa-
tion since the 1930s, and his work built on
previous philosophies of science that also
placed independent observation at the cen-
tre of scientific practice.9
While there were strong debates about the
extent to which human knowledge is fal-
lible, the orthodox view was that the need
for independent observation was not in ques-
tion. It began to appear to many people that
the reasons or purposes for undertaking
scientific research were secondary to the
robustness of the methods used.10 Some
scientists advocated a radical denial of pur-
pose, saying that all organisms, including
human beings, are deterministic ‘learning
machines’ (e.g., Skinner, 1971; Maze,
1983). Even if the existence of purposes was
accepted, such purposes could not be con-
sidered ‘scientific’ in the same sense as
observations; they were generally omitted
8 Reason (1996) disagrees with using the term ‘inter-
vention’, but I will not deal with this here. An ex-
planation of his position, and an argument against
it, can be found in Midgley (2000).
9 Many of these philosophies of science were far less
sophisticated than the one advanced by Popper.
For instance, the positivists working in the late
19th and early 20th Centuries asserted that science
should be entirely value-free. Popper (1972), in
contrast, argued that the values of scientists will
inevitably guide what will be the focus for investi-
gation, but independent observation can still be
achieved once this focus has been determined. See
Delanty (1997) and Romm (2001) for some inter-
esting reviews of this and other related debates.
10 Of course Popper stressed inter-subjective testabil-
ity within scientific communities, and said that
method alone is not an adequate determinant of
independent observation. However, a prime means
by which an individual scientist could influence the
consensus of scientists was by using a widely ac-
cepted method. Hence the overwhelming focus on
methods that was certainly still present when I gradu-
ated as a student of Psychology as late as 1982.
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from reports of experimental practice, and
could often only be deduced by reading be-
tween the lines of hypotheses. In this way,
the purposes and debates that made the hy-
potheses meaningful were largely hidden
from view.
It was in this atmosphere that Lewin 1946,
1947, 1948 mounted a strong critique of
‘pure’ science in favour of action research.
Lewin’s argument is that the institutions of
science invest massive resources into re-
search that has largely become divorced from
the goals of meeting human need and satis-
fying human desires (that is, the desires of
those outside the scientific community the
latter tends to value knowledge for its own
sake). In Lewin’s view, it is generally a mat-
ter of accident whether this research is rel-
evant to people working in industrial and
welfare organisations. Of course, there are
the applied natural sciences, like medicine,
but really nothing comparable for the worlds
of industry and human welfare where it is
much more difficult to control observations.
Essentially, Lewin, 1946 advocates the har-
nessing of science in the service of interven-
tion rather than observation. That is, science
should be undertaken in organisations for so-
cial benefit. He believes that scientists have a
choice: they can either conduct research for
the sake of pure curiosity, or help themselves
and others improve the social conditions that
surround them. When a problem is encoun-
tered in an organisation, research may be un-
dertaken to help define a way forward.
However, social purposes should not be sub-
ordinated to methodological purity: in Lewin’s
view, if research is being conducted in sup-
port of action, it makes little sense to subvert
the purposes that guide that action in the name
of scientific rigour. This means, for Lewin,
adapting the scientific method (when neces-
sary) to make it more meaningful in social
situations: instead of testing hypotheses, sci-
entists can identify questions that need an-
swering. Likewise, if it is impossible to set up
perfectly controlled conditions, they should
not call research ‘invalid’, but should still gen-
erate data in a manner that supports decision-
making—even if strongly scientific conclusions
cannot be reached. After all, organisational de-
cisions will have to be taken anyway, and it is
preferable to take them on the basis of imper-
fect data than using no data at all.
Of course, embedding scientific practice in
social situations, and adapting it in the ser-
vice of intervention, will affect the degree
of independent observation that can be
achieved. Far from keeping one’s distance
from the observed, in Lewin’s 1946, model
of action research the observer is encour-
aged to find a means to eliminate socially
undesirable phenomena and promote desir-
able ones. What counts as desirable or un-
desirable obviously needs to be defined by
participants in the local situation, which is
why Lewin 1952, produced his “field
theory”—a “field” is a set of phenomena that
can be seen as directly interacting with an
object (person, group or organisation) of
concern. The boundaries of the “field” de-
marcate what is and is not relevant in an
analysis. We see that, in Lewin’s perspec-
tive, observation is not independent of the
values of the observer (these values deter-
mine what initial question is asked), but is
nevertheless ‘factual’ in the sense that a re-
alist ontology is assumed—so observations
reflect the real world (albeit imperfectly
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through our fallible perceptions).11 Also,
because of the context of action which takes
place over time, observations tend to be
most meaningful as a sequence which con-
stitutes feedback to actor(s) who are re-
quired to make judgements about the
success, or otherwise, of their actions.
It appears that, while Lewin 1946, 1948, is
primarily concerned with intervention, he
does not entirely abandon observation—but
it is harnessed into the service of the former.
Also, where controlled observation is im-
possible, other means of supporting inter-
vention through research are explored.
Therefore, the principle of independent ob-
servation is not abandoned, but it is subor-
dinated to the principle of social utility.
This work has since been developed by a
variety of different authors, both in the ac-
tion research and other communities. One of
the most notable examples is Seidman 1988
who, following Dewey 1946, as well as
Lewin 1947, advocates a much stronger op-
position between observation and interven-
tion. Instead of arguing that science should
be harnessed into the cause of intervention,
Seidman suggests that the two concepts are
mutually exclusive because they are differ-
entiated by the involvement of action. Sci-
ence requires the exclusion of action on the
grounds that changing the phenomenon of
interest corrupts the purity of observation,
while intervention is founded upon action
(also see Reason and Heron, 1995).
1.1.2 Summary of the
distinction between observation
and intervention
At this point I have made a clear distinction
between observation (as used in science)
and intervention, the former being about
seeing things in a manner that is not ‘con-
taminated’ by the actions of the observer,
and the latter being about the actions of
agents to promote change. However, it
should already be apparent from the discus-
sion of Lewin’s (1946, 1948) work (above)
that observation and intervention do not have
to be regarded as opposites (although they
often are)—observation can be undertaken
in the service of intervention.
Of course, a counter-argument could be that
de-prioritising the principle of independent
observation, which is implied in this way of
thinking, simply undermines science. If sci-
ence does not seek to preserve the indepen-
dence of the observer through the design of
methods, and through scrutiny by scientific
communities, it may cease to be useful for
both pure and applied studies. Worse, if we
allow the purposes of the observer to be
discussed as an integral aspect of scientific
practice (rather than accepting them as in-
evitable determinants of the focus of inquiry
that are essentially non-scientific), we could
open the door to the domination of science
by political ideology (Popper, 1966). How-
ever, the validity of these counter-arguments
11 In this sense, Lewin’s (1946, 1948, 1952) philo-
sophical assumptions are similar to Popper’s
(1959). Popper says that values determine the
focus of science, and that observations (imper-
fectly) reflect the real world. However, Popper
(1966) argues against what he sees as the imposi-
tion of a social utility agenda on science. He also
strongly demarcates the supposedly non-scien-
tific world of values from the world of facts—in
his view, it is only legitimate for scientists to
focus their inquiries on the latter.
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rests on the assumption that independent
observation is actually possible—or at least,
if it is seen as an ideal (rather than being
actually achievable), that we can know how
near to, or how far from, the ideal we are.
In my view the actual achievement of inde-
pendent observation is impossible, and
judgements about distance from an ideal of
independent observation are inevitably un-
certain. My reasons are detailed below.
2. The impossibility of independent
observation
Let us start the analysis with the insight, com-
mon to both systems thinkers and complex-
ity theorists, that everything in the universe
is interconnected. Such a perspective pre-
cludes the possibility that an observer can be
truly independent of the observed. In von
Bertalanffy’s (1968) general systems theory,
and in the works of other writers,12 the Uni-
verse is made up of hierarchies of open sys-
tems with semi-permeable boundaries: all
systems interact with their environments, and
there is no such thing as a truly autonomous
entity. This means that observers are part of
the reality they observe: they cannot observe
from outside the systems of mutual causal-
ity in which they participate. Although links
between the observer and the observed may
be indirect, they do exist, and therefore
wholly independent observation is impossible.
Of course, it might be argued that some in-
terconnections between the observer and
observed are more significant than others.
Vickers (1972) compares observations of
our solar system with observations of so-
cial systems in which the scientist is a par-
ticipant. In the former case, he claims that
the interconnections between the observer
and observed are relatively trivial (at least
as far as scientific observation is con-
cerned), while the interconnections between
human beings in social systems are strongly
implicated in social-scientific observations.
Decisions to undertake observations are
made taking account of these interconnec-
tions, and observations of human behaviour
can feed back to transform what is observed.
For this reason, Vickers makes the claim
that natural and human systems are funda-
mentally different.
In one sense, it would be easy to accept a
distinction between ‘human’ and ‘natural’
systems, as it neatly reflects the familiar di-
vision between the ‘social’ and ‘natural’
sciences. This would mean that we only have
to be sceptical about independent observa-
tion in relation to social science. However, I
have two reasons for refusing to accept this
distinction.
First, as someone with an interest in sys-
tems thinking, which prioritises the ideal of
transdisciplinary inquiry, I find it difficult to
conform to ‘arbitrary’ divisions between
scientific disciplines.13 It seems to me that12 Many writers on systems thinking and complex-
ity take this view. See, for example, Bogdanov
(1913-1917), Koehler (1938), Boulding (1956),
Kremyanskiy (1958), von Bertalanffy (1968),
Bateson (1972), Miller (1978), Prigogine and
Stengers (1984), Laszlo (1995), Capra (1996),
Allen (1997), Hardy (1998), Holland (1998) and
Cilliers (1998).
13 A great deal has been written about the limita-
tions that disciplinary boundaries impose on the
generation of knowledge (e.g., von Bertalanffy,
1968; Lovelock, 1988; Midgley, 2001).
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human systems can legitimately be studied
as natural phenomena: there is, for instance,
a great deal of systems research that views
families, organisations, communities and
societies as ‘living systems’ (e.g., Miller,
1978).14 Conversely, natural systems can
quite reasonably be studied as social con-
structs (see, for example, Darier, 1999).
After all, if we are critical of naïve positiv-
ism, the most we can claim is to have ac-
cess to our knowledge of natural systems,
not the systems themselves.15
My second reason for refusing the distinc-
tion between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ systems
is linked to this. There is strong evidence
that observers construct observations of
natural systems (as well as social ones) in
ways that are not the same for all people.
This is an insight that has been surfaced in
different ways across a range of scientific
disciplines. For example, in physics, Einstein
(1934) claims that our inability to know the
world “as it really is” means that human
“speculation” has to be an integral part of
physics. Once proposed, this idea took root
in physics through the development of quan-
tum theory, which challenges the conven-
tional separation of the observer from the
observed by empirically demonstrating that
the former cannot help but influence the lat-
ter (Bohr, 1963). Indeed, quantum theory
proposes the existence of sub-atomic par-
ticles that are not directly observable at all,
so these propositions must be based on some-
thing in addition to empirical evidence—meta-
physics (the non-empirical realm of ideas).
Thus, the scientific orthodoxy identified by
Einstein (1934) that “the belief in an external
world independent of the perceiving subject
is the basis of all natural science” was thrown
into doubt. The worlds of physical and meta-
physical reality came to be seen as insepa-
rable (Prigogine, 1989).
Similar ideas have been explored in biology
too. Like the quantum theorists, Northrop
(1967) focuses on the inevitability of meta-
physics. If biological theories are about the
identification of patterns in empirical data,
then an understanding of metaphysics re-
veals that human beings, in looking for pat-
terns, must employ ideas that have their
origins outside the empirical data itself. Like-
wise, in psychology there have been theo-
rists who have stood out against the
philosophy of independent observation (e.g.,
Kelly, 1955; Weimer, 1979; Hollway, 1989),
as there have been in sociology (e.g., Brown,
1977), systems thinking (e.g., Maturana,
1988a,b; de Zeeuw, 1992; Alrøe, 2000) and
complexity science (e.g., Fitzgerald, 1999).
Inevitably, this lightening review of a variety
of fields of study has ignored the differences
between the opinions of the cited authors.
Rather, I have focused on what they have in
14 There are also writers who are critical of this work
(e.g., Merkel and Searight, 1992; Pam, 1993).
However, we need not fall into the trap of saying
that this is the only valid way of viewing social
systems. If we welcome a ‘living systems’ approach
as one amongst a plurality of useful ways of think-
ing, we can gain insights from it without necessar-
ily succumbing to its limitations (Rosenblatt, 1994).
15 Saying that both approaches are reasonable might
appear contradictory, but I believe they can be
reconciled through a new, pluralistic approach to
systems philosophy. However, this is beyond the
scope of the current paper (see Midgley, 2000,
for details).
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common: a critical attitude to the idea that it
is possible to have genuinely independent
observation. The substance of the critique of
independent observation is that people bring
different knowledge resources to observa-
tions, so there can never be any guarantee
that they will see things in the same ways.
Of course, it could be argued (following
Popper, 1959) that independent observation
is an ideal, not something that is actually
achievable. However, aiming towards an
ideal suggests that, given two observations,
we can reliably judge which is closer to
the ideal. But even this is uncertain. If Pop-
per is right to say that we should never take
objectivity for granted because future work
by people in the scientific community could
reveal something that suggests the intru-
sion of subjectivity, then the distance be-
tween any actual observation and the ideal
of independent observation cannot, in prin-
ciple, be determined. Something that ap-
pears, on one day, to be as close as we can
get to an independent observation might be
seen, the next day, as very distant from it.
All we have, then, are temporary judge-
ments about independent observation by
members of scientific communities, and
these judgements could (in principle) be
undermined at any time.
We are now left with the question, if truly
independent observation is impossible, and
the ideal of independent observation is
problematic, where does this leave science?
My argument, to be developed below, is
that the construction of scientific obser-
vation should be regarded as a form, but
by no means the only valid or useful form,
of intervention.
3. Observation as intervention
A key word in the above sentence is ‘con-
struction’. Scientific observation is not just
any observation, but a moment in which the
situation is constructed to facilitate observa-
tion under controlled conditions. There are
two levels at which this kind of observation
is dependent on the involvement of particu-
lar agents: first, in actually undertaking the
observation; and second, at a ‘higher’ level,
in establishing the goals and parameters of
the observation. Below, I discuss each of these
levels and then describe how Popper (1959,
1976) addresses them. While Popper does
account for both forms of dependency on
agents when discussing how to define ‘ob-
jectivity’, I nevertheless argue that his view
that science should only be concerned with
pursuing the ideal of truth,16  not exploring
values, sits uncomfortably with his accep-
tance of this dependency. This then opens
the door for us to recast observation as an
aspect of intervention. Let us start, then, by
looking at the two levels at which agents are
implicated in constructing observations.
First, scientific observation is dependent on
the involvement of particular agents because
interpretation is integral to the act of obser-
vation itself. What the scientist is able to see
will in part be determined by his or her ex-
pectations, which in turn will be coloured by
16 Popper (1959) talks about an ideal of truth, not
truth itself, because he follows Kant (1787) in
arguing that we can only know our knowledge
constructs, not reality itself. Nevertheless, he still
believes that truth is something we ought to aim
towards, even if we can never know for sure if or
when we have attained it.
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the language s/he uses and the values flow-
ing into the act of observation. To illustrate,
in experiments in which people are asked to
look into a tachistoscope (a machine that
feeds one picture into one eye and another
into the other), some interesting effects oc-
cur. If people are fed two faces, one upside-
down and the other the right way up, they
invariably only see the one that is the right
way up (Engel, 1956; Hastorf and Myro,
1959). In a similar experiment, Bagby (1957)
took U.S. and Mexican citizens and fed them
the same two images: one a North Ameri-
can landscape and the other a Mexican one.
In almost every case, people only saw the
one that was culturally familiar to them. This
indicates that the brain, linked to its envi-
ronment, is actively constructing the obser-
vation, not simply reflecting what enters the
eye. Observation takes place using concep-
tual and emotional frameworks of interpre-
tation (Maturana, 1988a,b; Maturana and
Varela, 1992).
Second, at a ‘higher’ level, agents are also
implicated in constructing observations
when they set the goals and parameters for
them—when they ask, what exactly should
be observed? This is a moral question as
much as a practical one, as scientists have
choices about what to observe. There is a
value judgement, whether consciously
recognised or not, involved in every deci-
sion to study one thing rather than another
(e.g., Churchman, 1979; Ulrich, 1983;
Alrøe, 2000; Midgley, 2000; Romm, 2001).
Popper’s (1959) answer to the first of the
above issues, that interpretation is integral to
observation, is to stress the importance of
the scientific community in determining what
counts as objective. Basically, the more people
who scrutinise the findings of scientists, the
more likely it is that idiosyncratic interpreta-
tions will be identified. However, it is worth
pointing out that a consensus among scien-
tists is not the same thing as true objectivity
because even a consensus in a professional
community can be the product of cultural
construction (Foucault, 1980)—so objectiv-
ity remains an ideal, not something that we
can know we have achieved. Popper’s an-
swer to the second issue, that value judge-
ments are involved in setting the goals and
parameters of observations, is simply to ac-
cept that this is the case. Indeed, the positiv-
ist idea that science can be totally value-free
has been largely discredited (Resnik, 1998;
ESRC Global Environmental Change Pro-
gramme, 1999). Nevertheless, he still argues
that scientists should focus on pursuing the
ideal of truth, leaving explorations of values
to others (Popper, 1966). As he sees it, de-
mocracy itself is dependent on keeping a
strict separation between matters of fact and
value: if science comes under the influence
of ideology then the pursuit of truth may be
severely compromised. Popper argues that,
in a society in which science is constrained
in this way, informed democratic decision-
making is impossible.
However, from a systems point of view (e.g.,
Ulrich, 1983)—and also from a critical
theory viewpoint (e.g., Habermas, 1972,
1984a,b)—this strong separation of moral
decision making from the act of observation
cannot be sustained. Because the two inter-
act, in principle they should both be avail-
able for critical analysis. I suggest that, if
we acknowledge that agents are involved in
interpreting observations, and we accept that
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value judgements guide what is investigated,
we cannot legitimately follow Popper’s pre-
scriptive path which places the exploration
of values outside the remit of science.17
Of course, in practical situations, bound-
aries have to be drawn around the inquiry
process, but it seems to me that there can
be no general case for excluding value
judgements from inquiry—only local cases
for momentary exclusions while observa-
tions are being undertaken. In other words,
moral inquiry can be suspended temporarily
while an act of observation is carried out,
simply because the agent cannot do two
things at once, and it can be resumed once
again in the light of the observation and pre-
vious moral inquiries.18
So, in many different ways we have seen
that agents are implicated in constructing
observations: through their direct and indi-
rect interactions with the observed; through
their interpretations of sense data; through
their selection of concepts to guide obser-
vation; and by making value judgements
about what to observe. It should be clear
from this that observation, as a purposeful
act, can only be isolated from its context by
artificially ignoring what flows into it and
the consequences it gives rise to. In my
view, it is hard to justify placing this artifi-
cial boundary around it—especially as the
choice of what to observe and how to ob-
serve it has unavoidable moral consequences
for action (which may sometimes be antici-
pated and sometimes not).
Given this state of affairs, I argue that it is
more appropriate to take account of the
construction of observation than to turn
one’s back on it. Once the moral, subjec-
tive, linguistic and other influences on ob-
servation are opened to critical reflection,
scientific observation has to be seen as a
form of intervention: observation is under-
taken purposefully, by an agent, to create
change in the knowledge and/or practice of
a community of people. It is this purposeful
action of an agent that is the defining fea-
ture of intervention.
Of course, methods of scientific observa-
tion provide a set of techniques for inter-
vention that can be seen to have significant
uses and limitations. These methods have
been given pride of place in the last three
hundred years of Western intellectual his-
tory, largely because of the focus of phi-
losophers of science on maintaining the
shibboleth of independent observation and
17 Towards the end of this paper I will argue that, far
from opening science to political domination, this
exploration of values protects us from ideological
dogmatism.
18 One possible argument against this is that there is a
difference between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ science.
Some might say that those conducting applied sci-
ence should indeed undertake moral inquiry, but
pure science is curiosity-driven; its ethical implica-
tions are generally unknown or uncertain; and it
less obviously involves intervention. My answer
to this is that even pure science involves interven-
tion in the sense that it is designed to produce
knowledge that will make a difference in scientific
debates. There may be similarities and differences
between the ethical issues impacting on pure and
applied scientific projects, but in choosing to un-
dertake a particular piece of pure, curiosity-driven
research, the scientist is still making a value judge-
ment that this is the right thing to do. S/he could,
for instance, have taken on some other research
project. This kind of judgement is therefore just as
amenable to moral inquiry as that made by the
applied scientist—it just means acknowledging that
factors other than curiosity can and should be con-
sidered in forming pure research agendas.
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thereby denigrating methods of intervention.
As I believe that I have demonstrated that
scientific observation should also be viewed
as a form of intervention, I argue that sci-
entists should welcome a whole host of
other methods that are more self-con-
sciously concerned with action for change.
Of course, there are many communities of
writers, including several with an interest in
systems thinking and complexity, which
have been developing methodologies and
methods for intervention despite the disin-
terest, or even disapproval, of the scientific
establishment. It is mainly to this work that
I refer in other writings (e.g., Midgley,
2000) that stress the value of methodologi-
cal pluralism: the use of a wide variety of
intervention methods to pursue a corre-
spondingly wide variety of purposes.
3.1 Systemic intervention
I have defined intervention in terms of pur-
poseful action by an agent to create change,
and have argued that scientific methods can
be used as part of intervention practice. How-
ever, this still does not deal with all of the
issues thrown up by systems thinking and
complexity science. If we were to conceive
of intervention as flawlessly pre-planned
change based on accurate predictions of the
consequences of action, we would be as-
suming the mechanistic vision of the Uni-
verse that systems thinking and complexity
science seek to challenge. Mechanism is the
view that everything can be observed and
described as if it is a machine—a predict-
able, functional, inherently understandable
object (Pepper, 1942). According to this
view, all the things in the world (including
human beings, organisations and societies)
are like clockwork toys. If we can figure
out how they work, then we will be able to
change them according to our will, within
the limits of the natural laws to which they
conform. As systems thinking and complex-
ity science both fundamentally undermine
this mechanistic world-view by highlight-
ing issues of uncertainty and non-linear in-
teraction (see Flood and Carson, 1993, for
an introduction), there is a need to further
clarify our understanding of ‘intervention’
to avoid the pernicious interpretation of it
mentioned above. I therefore wish to pro-
pose that we should think in terms of sys-
temic intervention. The following account
is heavily abbreviated, and more informa-
tion can be found in Midgley (2000).
I argue that the boundary concept lies at the
heart of systems thinking (and Cilliers, 1998,
makes a similar claim in relation to com-
plexity science). Because of the fact that
everything in the universe is directly or in-
directly connected with everything else,
where the boundaries are placed in any analy-
sis becomes crucial. The ‘cut-off point’ for
analysis will make some things visible and
others invisible. Systems thinkers pursue the
ideal of comprehensiveness, but know that
this is unattainable. However, reflection on
the boundaries of knowledge at least enables
us to consider options for inclusion, exclu-
sion and marginalisation. It also reminds us
that all understandings are incomplete: there
is a need for humility and openness to the
perspectives of others (Churchman, 1979).
If intervention is purposeful action by an
agent to create change, then systemic inter-
vention is purposeful action by an agent to
create change in relation to reflection on
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boundaries. This statement embodies the
core concern of the methodology of sys-
temic intervention that I will be introducing
over the coming pages.
3.1.1 Towards a methodology
for systemic intervention
At the bare minimum, I suggest that an ad-
equate methodology for systemic interven-
tion should be explicit about three things:
boundary critique; theoretical and method-
ological pluralism; and action for improve-
ment. These are discussed below.
Boundary critique
There is a need for agents to reflect critically
upon, and make choices between, boundaries
(as mentioned at the end of the previous sec-
tion). Boundaries define both what issues are
to be included, excluded or marginalised in
analyses, and who is to be consulted or in-
volved (the two are obviously linked, as dif-
ferent agents will have different concerns).
Because of the ‘who’ question, issues of
power and participation are unavoidable in
systemic intervention (Churchman, 1979;
Ulrich, 1983; Brown, 1996; Midgley, 1997a,
2000; Vega-Romero, 1999).
An important aspect of my understanding
of boundaries is that boundary judgements
are intimately linked with value judgements
(Churchman, 1979; Ulrich, 1983): the val-
ues adopted in any intervention will direct
the drawing of boundaries that define the
knowledge accepted as pertinent. Similarly,
the inevitable process of drawing boundaries
constrains the ethical stance taken and the
values pursued. Making decisions about
boundaries is therefore an ethical business.
It is also important to note that, regardless
of how detailed the process of critical re-
flection on values and boundaries actually
is, there may still be surprises as things ex-
cluded from view interact with whatever is
the focus of attention. While boundary cri-
tique cannot altogether eliminate surprises,
it can help minimise them. Also, because
things change over time, boundary judge-
ments need to be regularly reviewed as part
of a learning process (Ulrich, 1983; Brown
and Packham, 1999).19
Of course, it is only possible for agents to
make boundary judgements through the use
of (implicit or explicit) theories and meth-
ods, and reflection leading to the making of
boundary judgements is an activity (it is in-
tervention to shape the agent’s understand-
ing, which may in turn influence future
action). Critical reflection upon boundary
judgements is vital because it is only by way
of boundary critique that the ethical conse-
quences of different possible actions (and
the ways of seeing they are based upon)
can be subject to analysis.20
19 There is a substantial body of literature on the
theory, methodology and practice of boundary
critique: e.g., Churchman (1970, 1979); Ulrich
(1983, 1994, 1996); Midgley (1992, 1994, 1997b,
2000); Midgley et al (1998); Brown and Packham
(1999); Vega-Romero (1999); Cordoba et al
(2000); and Yolles (2001).
20 This exposition of boundary critique has left out,
or made only passing reference to, a number of
important issues. These include the extension of
the concept of boundary judgement to encompass
concerns about how things ought to be; the im-
portance of wide-spread stakeholder participation
in systemic intervention; and the need for agents
to deal with the marginalisation of particular is-
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Theoretical and methodological pluralism
The second aspect of a methodology for
systemic intervention that should be made
explicit is the need for agents to make
choices between theories and methods to
guide action, which requires a focus on theo-
retical and methodological pluralism. These
two forms of pluralism have meaning in
terms of the focus on boundary judgements
mentioned above: if understandings can be
bounded in many different ways, then each
of these boundaries may suggest the use of
a different theory (and conversely, each
theory implies particular boundary judge-
ments). Methodological pluralism then also
becomes meaningful because methods and
methodologies embody different theoretical
assumptions: choices between boundaries
and theories suggest which methods might
be most appropriate (and conversely,
choices between methods imply particular
theoretical and boundary judgements).
Choice between theories and methods is also
a form of action, in the same way as reflec-
tion on, and choice between, boundary
judgements can be seen as action: it is inter-
vention in the present to shape a strategy
for future intervention.21
Action for improvement
Finally, an adequate methodology for systemic
intervention should be explicit about taking
action for improvement—action for the bet-
ter, which cannot, of course, be defined in an
absolutely objective manner. ‘Improvement’
needs to be understood temporarily and lo-
cally: as different agents may use different
boundary judgements, what looks like an im-
provement through one pair of eyes may look
like the very opposite through another
(Churchman, 1970).22 Also, even if there is
widespread agreement between all those di-
rectly affected by an intervention that it con-
stitutes an improvement, this agreement may
not stretch to future generations. The tempo-
rary nature of all improvements makes the
concept of sustainable improvement particu-
larly important: while even sustainable im-
provements cannot last forever, gearing
improvement to long-term stability is essen-
tial if future generations are to be accounted
for. We can say that an improvement has been
made when a desired consequence has been
sues and stakeholders within social contexts. These
are dealt with in Ulrich (1983), Midgley et al
(1998) and Midgley (2000).
21 Many issues have been left unexplored by this short
exposition, including paradigm incommensurabil-
ity, standards for choice between theories, theo-
retical coherence/incoherence, how to develop the
methodological knowledge base of agents, etc. All
these issues are covered in Midgley (2000).
22 An example is logging a stretch of rain forest,
which may bring about an improvement in the
eyes of the logging company’s employees and
those who consume the wood that is generated,
but may be considered as damaging by tribal people
who are displaced from their ancestral lands, and
by conservationists concerned with the preserva-
tion of species diversity. As Churchman (1970)
says, every improvement assumes boundaries de-
fining what consequences of intervention are to
be taken into account, and what are to be ignored
or regarded as peripheral. In the above example,
the logging will only be viewed as bringing about
an improvement if the displacement of tribal
people and the reduction of species diversity are
excluded from the boundaries of analysis. Clearly,
what is included in the boundaries of analysis and
who conducts this analysis are both vital issues in
defining improvement.
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realised through intervention. In contrast, a
sustainable improvement has been achieved
when this seems like it will last into the in-
definite future without the appearance of un-
desired consequences (or a redefinition of the
original consequences as undesirable). Of
course, whether an improvement is sustain-
able or not is a matter of judgement (and
judgements are inevitably temporary and lo-
cal, even if they are widely accepted): the limi-
tations of human understanding mean that
what may appear to be sustainable at one
moment may seem less so at the next. There-
fore, in aiming for sustainable improvement,
agents involved in systemic intervention need
to periodically review the criteria of
sustainability that they are using.
The notion of improvement is important
because agents are restricted in the number
of interventions they can undertake, and
must therefore make decisions about what
they should and should not do. The extent
to which various interventions look like they
may or may not bring about improvements,
or may bring about improvements that have
greater or lesser priority, is a useful crite-
rion for making these decisions.
Of course, I should say why I have used
the term ‘improvement’ rather than, say, the
creation of beauty, pleasure, knowledge,
understanding, emancipation or spiritual
enlightenment. The answer is that, if we
value any of these things, the creation of
these represents an improvement. The term
‘improvement’ is therefore general enough
to have meaning in relation to almost any
value system: it simply indicates the pur-
poseful action of an agent to create a change
for the better. In the case of ‘pure’ science,
this may simply be a change in our knowl-
edge base and/or understanding of the
world.23
Interrelating the three activities
These three activities—reflecting on value
and boundary judgements; making choices
concerning theory and method; and taking
action for improvement—are clearly insepa-
rable. Doing one always implies doing the
other two as well, although the focus of at-
tention may shift from one to another as-
pect of this trinity so that none remain
implicit and thereby escape critical analy-
sis. The separation between the three is
therefore analytical rather than factual: it
ensures a proper consideration of a mini-
mum set of three ‘angles’ on possible paths
for intervention. Making all of them a spe-
cific focus of a methodology for systemic
intervention guides the reflections of the
agent, ensuring that boundaries, values,
23 It should be noted that there is a counter-argument
to this. According to Rorty (1989), using a term
like improvement (or truth, legitimacy, ontology,
morality, etc.) suggests a belief in absolute facts or
values. Rorty believes that such words are tainted.
To talk of improvement is to talk about the attain-
ment of a state that everybody would agree is bet-
ter. Rorty has launched a fierce critique of the
apparent certainties of modernity. He offers a pow-
erful argument, but why abandon words like truth,
morality and improvement? If we are prepared to
be critical about the business of making boundary
judgements, there is no need to assume that under-
standings of improvement are universal. To aban-
don words like truth, morality and improvement is
to risk slipping into negativity and inaction. To
tear away the modernist certainties surrounding
their use and clothe them with an awareness of the
frailty of human understanding is to preserve the
possibility of positive action while facing the com-
plexities of this head on.
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theories, methods, and action for improve-
ment all receive explicit consideration. The
three activities, diagrammed in relation to
one another, are presented in Figure 1. Cri-
tique specifically means boundary critique
(reflection on, and choice between, bound-
aries and associated values); judgement
means judgement about which theories and
methods might be most appropriate; and
action means the implementation of meth-
ods to create improvement (however this is
to be understood by different actors in the
local context).
Figure 1
Three aspects of a methodology for
systemic intervention
4. Implications for society
Having presented the methodology of sys-
temic intervention, which can encompass
methods of observation used in the service
of knowledge generation, I will end the main
body of the paper with some brief reflec-
tions on its implications for society.
Earlier, I mentioned Popper’s (1966) argu-
ment that science needs to be protected from
the imposition of political ideology: he ad-
vocates granting freedom to scientists to
pursue the cumulative development of
knowledge, aiming towards an ideal of truth.
His claim is that we must preserve the ‘open
society’: a democratic society based on ra-
tional inquiry that is capable of using science
to eliminate primitive superstition. Accord-
ing to Popper, there are forms of ideology
(such as Marxist ‘historicism’24) which
threaten the open society by enforcing rules
concerning what it is and is not legitimate to
explore. These forms of ideology are there-
fore to be resisted, and the ideal of truth is to
be preserved as the focus of science.
There are many assumptions in this argu-
ment that have been thoroughly debated in
the last 25 years. These include the strong
distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘pre-mod-
ern’ societies (Latour, 1991); the cumula-
tive development of knowledge (Kuhn,
1970); the value of the ideal of truth (Rorty,
1989); the nature of ‘rationality’ (Foucault,
1980); and the necessity of questioning tra-
dition (MacIntyre, 1985). However, for the
purposes of this paper, I wish to focus on
the strong division in Popper’s worldview
between the pursuit of truth and the explo-
ration of values. Contrary to Popper, I ar-
gue that marginalising the exploration of
values makes science more prone to ideo-
logical manipulation, not less so.
The crux of my argument is that, if we al-
low the value judgements that inevitably flow
into decisions on what to research to be
 
Critique 
Judgement Action 
24 Historicism, according to Popper (1966), is the
belief that the course of history is predetermined
(e.g., by structural economic forces). This kind of
belief informs people’s actions in the world, bring-
ing them nearer to the ‘inevitable’ future. Histori-
cism therefore involves a self-fulfilling prophesy.
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shaped by whatever macro-social and eco-
nomic forces exist in society, without criti-
cal reflection, then we give up one of the
key means that we have of protecting our-
selves against totalising ideologies.25
Of course, Popper was writing at a time of
‘grand’ ideological debates. The first edition
of The Open Society and its Enemies was
published in 1945 when fascism had just
been overthrown in Western Europe; capi-
talism was seen as either the saviour or the
enemy of the ‘free’ world (depending on
your point of view); and Marxism was on
the rise. It could be argued that, as we enter
the Twenty-First Century, we have no more
need for protection against totalising ideolo-
gies, and therefore this debate about science
and values is simply redundant. I strongly
resist such a view, for two reasons. First, it
would be a very short sighted view of his-
tory to think that, just because we have seen
the end of the Twentieth Century confron-
tation between capitalism and socialism, this
spells the final demise for all totalising ide-
ologies. Second, as forces of globalisation
proliferate, and we experience economic
forces that are beyond the control of indi-
vidual nation states, it could be argued that
we are more at risk of being subsumed by a
totalising ideology than ever before. It’s no
longer Marxist historicism that pulls us to-
wards an ‘inevitable’ future, but the dis-
course of global market forces (Robertson,
1998) and a culture pivoted around individual
consumer choice (Gare, 1996).
The idea of bringing explorations of values
alongside observational methods, as sug-
gested by the methodology of systemic in-
tervention presented in this paper, could
support scientists and other citizens in work-
ing participatively to reveal more of what
flows into the making of truth judgements.
This kind of exploration enables us to ask
new and different questions about what
forms of intervention we should pursue,
including what should be the focus of ob-
servational research. Also, because this is a
methodology that is explicit about the need
for reflection on value and boundary judge-
ments on an on-going basis, it encourages
resistance to totalising ideologies which re-
quire a continual reference back to a single
‘truth’—a single uncritically-accepted
boundary and associated value judgement.
Conclusion
In this paper I have chosen to side-step the
usual starting points for debate about com-
plexity and the philosophy of science which
tend to assume that science is primarily
about observation. Instead, I opened my
argument by exploring the concept of in-
tervention, and defined intervention as
purposeful action by an agent to create
change. I then contrasted this with the con-
cept of observation. While some authors
suggest that intervention and observation are
opposites, I have argued that observation
(as undertaken in science) should be viewed
as just one type of intervention. We should
25 This is similar (but not identical) to the argu-
ments of some critical and systems theorists in
the second half of the 20th Century (see, for ex-
ample, Habermas, 1971, 1972, 1984a,b; Foucault,
1980, 1984; Ulrich, 1983; Fay, 1987; Jackson,
1991; Oliga, 1996 and Gregory, 2000). As I see it,
there is considerable scope for dialogue between
critical theorists, systems thinkers and philoso-
phers of science.
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therefore welcome scientific techniques of
observation into a pluralistic armoury of in-
tervention methods, alongside methods for
exploring values, reflecting on subjective
understandings, planning future activities, etc.
Having redefined scientific observation as
intervention, I then returned to systems
thinking and complexity ideas to advocate a
methodology of systemic intervention. This
focuses attention on the need for boundary
critique (reflection on, and choice between,
boundaries and associated values); judge-
ment (concerning appropriate theories and
methods); and action for improvement (de-
fined temporarily and locally).
Finally, I ended with a brief discussion of
the implications of this methodology for
society. In particular, I emphasised its value
in terms of resisting totalising ideologies. It
also encourages a critical and participative
attitude to intervention—including forms of
intervention that incorporate the traditional
observational methods of science.
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